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INTRODUCTION 
Courts in this country have long recognized the dangers of eyewitness testimony:  
“[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts 
for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor.”  United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 229 (1967).  Indeed, in its effort to address concerns about the risk of 
eyewitness misidentification, this Court has been on the forefront of efforts to incorporate 
social science research findings into the law governing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence.  State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).  Concerns about eyewitness misidentification are particularly 
acute where, as here, the testimony of a single eyewitness is the sole evidence of a 
defendant’s guilt.   
This case presents this Court with an opportunity to re-examine the legal 
framework for assessing eyewitness identification evidence, a task it has not done in the 
30 years since it decided Ramirez.  Over that period, social scientists have conducted 
extensive research in the area of eyewitness memory and perception that has significantly 
advanced our understanding of how memory works and what factfinders know about 
human memory.  During the same period, the work of organizations like Amicus Curiae 
the Innocence Project have shed light on the role of eyewitness misidentification in 
contributing to wrongful convictions established through post-conviction DNA testing.  
Indeed, eyewitness misidentification is the leading contributing cause of wrongful 
convictions established through DNA, playing a role in 72 percent of 342 DNA 
exonerations to date. 
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These developments, together with this Court’s commitment to ensuring that the 
law governing eyewitness identification evidence is fully aligned with the findings of 
social science research, require revisiting and updating Ramirez, as both the majority and 
dissenting judges in the court below agreed. 
Scientific research amply supports the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the witness’s 
identifications of Mr. Lujan should not have been admitted.  The conditions under which 
Mr. Lujan was identified—the poor lighting, the fact that the perpetrator wore a hat and 
was of a different race than the victim, and that the victim experienced high levels of 
stress at the time he claimed to have viewed Mr. Lujan—have all been shown to 
negatively affect memory.  State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 2, 357 P.3d 20.  
Likewise, scientific research confirms that suggestive circumstances like those 
surrounding the show-up and in-court identifications in this case influence not only the 
reliability of the identification itself, but also the many self-reported factors that the 
Ramirez test relies on to determine the admissibility of a challenged identification.   
This research can help to explain why the witness, who had three opportunities to 
identify Mr. Lujan, was only able to do so where suggestive circumstances made that 
identification obvious—first, at a highly suggestive show-up, where Mr. Lujan was 
handcuffed and was the only person not in a police uniform, id. ¶ 6, and then in an in-
court identification at a preliminary hearing, where Mr. Lujan was the “only defendant at 
counsel table” and the only reasonable choice, id. ¶ 8.  In contrast, the witness was unable 
to identify Mr. Lujan when he was presented as part of a six person lineup that was fairly 
composed and administered.  Id. ¶ 7.  The witness’s inability to identify Mr. Lujan in the 
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absence of suggestive circumstances that communicated to him that Mr. Lujan was the 
perpetrator suggests that the witness had not formed a reliable memory of the perpetrator 
at the time of the crime such that he could make a later accurate identification.   
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the State had not 
carried its burden of showing that the trial court’s admission of the eyewitness 
identification was harmless error.  Studies have shown that jurors tend to overvalue 
eyewitness testimony, overestimate the likely accuracy of eyewitness testimony, and 
confuse an eyewitness’s certainty with his or her accuracy.  Because the eyewitness’s 
testimony was crucial to the prosecution, the admission of the eyewitness identifications 
was not harmless error.  Id. ¶ 17 (“When the man’s identifications of Defendant are 
removed, the State’s case is severely weakened.”). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision and take this 
opportunity to revisit Ramirez in light of the last three decades of social science research 
and data from the DNA exonerations.  In so doing, this Court should reaffirm that the 
appropriate approach to such evidence is a totality of the circumstances test that allows 
for trial courts to consider any relevant factors based on a consensus in social science 
research and should clarify what factors now enjoy a consensus in the social science 
research.  Moreover, this Court should provide guidance to the lower courts on the use of 
intermediate remedies, including expert testimony, robust jury instructions, and limits on 
unreliable aspects of admissible eyewitness testimony, which can blunt the prejudicial 
effects of identification testimony that is the product of suggestive procedures or that may 
be unreliable, but is nonetheless admissible.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVISIT THE RAMIREZ FRAMEWORK BECAUSE 
IT IS UNDERMINED BY DECADES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
A. This Court Has Recognized and Attempted to Guard Against the Dangers 
of Eyewitness Testimony for Decades 
This Court first recognized and attempted to address the dangers of eyewitness 
identification testimony thirty years ago.  It was one of the first state supreme courts in 
the country to do so.  In State v. Long, the Court reviewed the scientific literature and 
concluded that it was “replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification.”  721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986).  The Long Court also 
recognized that, “[a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses 
inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems.”  Id. at 490.  To address these concerns, the Court required trial courts to give 
cautionary instructions on eyewitness identification testimony when requested by the 
defense in appropriate cases.  This instruction would be used to “pinpoint identification 
as a central issue and highlight the factors that bear on the reliability of that 
identification.”  Id. at 492. 
The Court revisited the issue of eyewitness identification testimony five years later 
in State v. Ramirez.  The Court’s opinion in that case reiterated its commitment to 
tackling the problems posed by eyewitness testimony through the application of scientific 
research findings to judicial decision making.  The Ramirez Court established a 
framework for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications that required “an in-depth 
appraisal of the identification’s reliability,” 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991), and that 
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rejected the federal standard, which the Court found to be “scientifically unsound.”  Id. at 
779–81.  Critical to the Court’s decision was its view that the scientific literature, which 
it had described and relied on in Long, compelled it to adopt “an analytic course that 
diverges somewhat from that in federal case law.”  Id. at 780. 
This Court most recently sought to refine its approach to eyewitness testimony in 
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103.  There, the Court focused on the fact that 
“[d]ecades of study . . . have established that eyewitnesses are prone to identifying the 
wrong person as the perpetrator of the crime.”  Id. ¶ 15.  In light of that concern, it sought 
to align Utah’s rules of evidence with the latest research on expert eyewitness 
identification testimony.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 16–18, 21–25, 30, 34 (recognizing that cautionary 
instructions and cross-examination were “poor substitutes” for expert eyewitness 
testimony and holding that the Utah rules of evidence should allow for “liberal and 
routine admission” of such testimony).  Although this Court has revisited issues relating 
to eyewitness identification testimony as part of its commitment to tackling this difficult 
issue, the Ramirez framework for assessing the reliability and the admissibility of such 
testimony remains in place.  When it was issued in 1991, Ramirez represented an 
important step forward in this area.  But the same commitment to aligning the law with 
scientific research on eyewitness identification that this Court has shown in cases such as 
Clopten, now highlights the need to revisit the framework established in Ramirez.1 
                                                 
1 Indeed, because it took current scientific research into account to modify the law on the 
admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony, Clopten calls the viability of the Ramirez 
test into question.  The modifications requested by the Innocence Project would bring the 
Ramirez test into line with Clopten. 
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B. Social Science Research Since Ramirez Demonstrates that the Ramirez 
Factors Are Insufficient to Protect Defendants from the Dangers of 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony 
The Ramirez test requires trial courts to consider the “totality of the 
circumstances,” which “must” include five enumerated factors:   
(1) “The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;  
(2) [T]he witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event;  
(3) [T]he witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity;  
(4) [W]hether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and  
(5) [T]he nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.  This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer 
during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same 
as the observer’s.” 
817 P.2d at 781.  
The Ramirez Court set itself apart from federal and other state supreme courts by 
applying a test that was expressly designed to “meet or exceed in rigor the federal 
standard as expressed in Biggers and Stovall.”  Id. at 780.  Rejecting some of the federal 
test’s criteria as “scientifically unsound,” the Court refined the factors in the federal test, 
expressly including consideration of race, and expressly rejecting witness certainty as an 
indicator of reliability.  Id. at 780–81.  In other respects, the Ramirez test mirrored the 
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federal test, however.  Both include the “opportunity of the witness to view” the 
perpetrator during the crime, and the “witness’s degree of attention,” factors that are, in 
many cases, evidenced by the witness’s own reporting of events which can undermine 
reliability.  See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).   
Although Ramirez relied explicitly on then-current scientific studies, research in 
the field has continued to advance.  Indeed, current social science research demonstrates 
that the Ramirez factors are insufficient to protect defendants from the dangers of faulty 
eyewitness identifications.  Most importantly, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists 
studying eyewitness memory have come to understand more fully the power of 
suggestion.  Today, research has demonstrated that suggestive circumstances can both 
(1) significantly impair a witness’s ability to make an accurate identification; and 
(2) artificially inflate a witness’s testimony concerning the other factors that remain part 
of both the federal and Utah tests.   
Neither of these concerns is adequately addressed in the Ramirez test.  That test 
buries the issue of suggestion in factor four:  “whether the witness’s identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion.”  817 P.2d at 781 (emphasis added).  This treatment of suggestion is both 
inaccurate and incomplete.  First, it incorrectly implies that identifications that are 
spontaneous and consistent have not been tainted by suggestive circumstances.  In truth, 
social scientists agree that suggestive circumstances can lead to a witness being more 
consistent and insistent in his or her identification.  See Charles A. Goodsell et al., Effects 
of Mugshot Commitment on Lineup Performance in Young and Older Adults, 23 Applied 
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Cognitive Psychol. 788, 789 (2009); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure 
Effects:  Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 (2006).  Thus, in 
considering factor four, courts may conclude that an identification is reliable and 
admissible because it was spontaneous and the witness was consistent, even if the very 
reason it appears reliable is that the identification was tainted by suggestion.   
Second, and more problematic, the Ramirez test fails to identify or offer courts 
guidance on how to address the pernicious effect of suggestive circumstances on witness 
memory, including as manifested in the other factors courts are required to consider.  
Indeed, in the 25 years since Ramirez, scientists have shown that that when an 
identification procedure is tainted by suggestion, that suggestion can contaminate a 
witness’s memory of the event, undermining the accuracy of the evidence most likely to 
be used to gauge reliability—the witness’s own testimony.  Many studies have 
characterized at least two of the Ramirez factors—opportunity to view and degree of 
attention—as prone to this problem.  See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, 
“Good, You Identified the Suspect”:  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of 
the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 366–67 (1998) (finding that the 
effect of suggestion was “large or very large” on witnesses’ “reports of certainty, view, 
ability to make out features of the face, attention, basis for making an identification, the 
amount of time taken to make an identification, willingness to testify, and trust of an 
identification made under these conditions”).  Because suggestive circumstances can 
influence a witness’s memory and recollection of both the original event and the 
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identification procedure itself, courts should be wary of basing a finding of reliability on 
these factors, which depend largely on witness testimony. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that these flaws are inherent in the 
federal test in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).  It observed that “[t]he irony 
of the current test is that the more suggestive the procedure, the greater the chance 
eyewitnesses will seem confident and report better viewing conditions.”  Id. at 918.  
Indeed, since Henderson, other courts and the prestigious National Academy of Science 
have highlighted the same flaw in the federal test.  See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 
687 (Or. 2012); Young v. State, Nos. A-11006/11015, 2016 WL 3369222, at *16 (Alaska 
June 17, 2016); National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification, at 65–66, available at http://www.nap.edu/read/18891/ 
chapter/6#65 (“NAS Report”).  Even though Ramirez improves upon the federal test in 
this regard—by rejecting a balancing approach and focusing on reliability as the primary 
concern—Ramirez does not go far enough to solve the problems identified in Henderson.  
Under Ramirez, trial courts are instructed to consider “self-reported” factors, but are not 
given guidance on how suggestion can influence those factors or how it can undermine 
the reliability of an identification more generally.  Thus, although the Ramirez test takes 
suggestive circumstances into consideration, as it should, it fails to adequately account 
for the interplay between suggestive circumstances and the other factors. 
In addition, since Ramirez, scientific research has confirmed and reinforced that 
witness memory—and therefore accuracy—can be affected dramatically by factors that 
are present at the time of the crime (known as “estimator variables,” including stress, the 
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presence of a weapon, the race of the witness and the perpetrator, and disguises as 
seemingly minor as hats) and factors that are present at the time of the identification 
procedure(s) (known as “system variables,” including the use of an administrator who 
does not know the identity of the suspect, pre-lineup witness instructions, and fair 
composition of the identification procedure).  See, e.g., Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence, Report & Recommendations to the Justices, 
at 59–71 (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/ 
eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf (“SJC Report”); NAS Report at 65–69.  The 
importance of these factors should not be overlooked; indeed, they likely undermined the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification in this case.  This Court should take into 
account this extensive body of research and consider the effect that these variables can 
have on witness memory. 
Ensuring that the law remains aligned with the last 25 years of scientific research 
requires revisiting Ramirez.  Both the majority and dissent in the Court of Appeals agreed 
that it is time for this Court to revisit Ramirez, and Amicus Curiae respectfully asks this 
Court to do the same.  See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 n.1 (“All of this, taken 
together, indicates that it is time for our Supreme Court to reconsider Ramirez, a 
proposition with which the dissent agrees.”). 
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C. This Court Should Confirm that Ramirez Requires a Totality of the 
Circumstances Approach, with Expert Testimony and Procedural 
Safeguards, to Limit the Harmful Prejudicial Effects of Unreliable 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony 
In order to address the problems with the Ramirez test, this Court should, first, 
reiterate and reemphasize the importance of the “totality of the circumstances” nature of 
the Ramirez test.  The Court should also give guidance to the lower courts sufficient to 
allow them to give meaning to the term and to do so in a way that is consistent across the 
state.  Amicus Curiae respectfully submits that this Court should instruct the lower courts 
to consider the “totality” of factors that are supported by a consensus of social science 
research and to take this opportunity to identify and explain those factors that currently 
enjoy such consensus.  The Court should emphasize nevertheless that the list of factors 
courts should consider in evaluating eyewitness identification evidence should be flexible 
enough to allow for the evolution of the relevant science, in recognition of the fact that 
scientific research is dynamic.  As the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and Connecticut 
have instructed, “‘[t]rial courts [should not be limited] from reviewing evolving, 
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.’”  State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 
735 (Conn. 2012) (quoting Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922); see also Lawson, 291 P.3d at 
685–86 (recognizing that “research is ongoing” and cautioning that the court’s 
acknowledgment of the current research “is not intended to preclude any party . . . from 
validating scientific acceptance of further research”).   
In other words, judicial understanding of the term “totality of the circumstances” 
should be given full force and effect:  lower courts should consider the universe of factors 
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that bear on reliability in the particular case, regardless of whether any particular factor 
fits neatly into the five “reliability” factors enumerated in Ramirez.  Emphasizing the fact 
that the Ramirez test requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including 
all system and estimator variables, the degree of suggestiveness, if any, and the effect of 
that suggestion on other factors, would reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions 
based on suggestive identification procedures, like the show-up and in-court 
identification used in this case, or identifications that scientific research shows are 
otherwise likely to be unreliable. 
We respectfully submit that, to accomplish this goal, the Court should issue 
findings on the current body of scientific research to guide lower courts on the factors 
they should consider in assessing the admissibility and reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.  This Court should make these findings by evaluating the current body of 
research on its own as the Oregon Supreme Court did in State v. Lawson,2 by appointing 
a special master3 or creating a study group,4 or by adopting the findings set forth by other 
                                                 
2 (See Lawson appendix attached as Addendum A.)  
3 The New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a special master to evaluate scientific 
evidence on eyewitness testimony.  The special master heard testimony from seven 
experts that produced more than 2,000 pages of transcripts and reviewed hundreds of 
scientific studies.  The special master issued an “extensive” 86-page report that the court 
later reviewed and adopted in part.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877. 
4 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts convened a study group on eyewitness 
identification to “offer guidance as to how our courts can most effectively deter 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful 
conviction.”  SJC Report at 1; Commonwealth v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 n.16 
(Mass. 2011) (announcing that the court will convene the study committee “[b]ecause 
eyewitness identification is the greatest source of wrongful convictions but also an 
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courts, as the Alaska Supreme Court did in State v. Young.  After issuing such findings, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon articulated an approach to the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification that screens eyewitness identification testimony through a stringent and 
precise application of the rules of evidence.5  Any of these approaches, if adopted here, 
would address the problems of the Ramirez test and ensure that trial courts throughout the 
state will evaluate identification evidence in light of more than thirty years of generally 
accepted scientific research findings about memory, perception and eyewitness 
reliability. 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson is instructive in this regard.  
There, the court sua sponte conducted a review of the social science research concerning 
eyewitness identification, reviewing more than 2,000 scientific studies.  Lawson, 291 
P.3d at 685.  After concluding that the Manson/Biggers factors incorporated in the 
Oregon state test for evaluating identification evidence6 did not adequately ensure the 
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, it took judicial notice of scientific 
                                                                                                                                                             
invaluable law enforcement tool . . . and because the research regarding eyewitness 
identification procedures is complex and evolving”).  The study group issued its report in 
2013, and the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled on its recommendations as they are 
presented in cases before the court.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 
900 (Mass. 2015) (adopting provisional jury instructions based on the study group’s 
findings). 
5 Alternatively, the Court could instruct the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Evidence to analyze current scientific research and reform the rules of evidence 
accordingly. 
6 The Manson/Biggers factors that were incorporated into Oregon’s test for the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications prior to Lawson contained some of the same 
factors found in Ramirez:  the witness’s opportunity to view the crime and the witness’s 
degree of attention to the perpetrator.  See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 684. 
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research findings and set out a comprehensive list of the variables courts should consider 
in weighing the reliability of this type of evidence.  (See Addendum A.)  The Lawson 
court explained its approach:   
[W]e believe that it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the 
bar be informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification because . . . the 
reliability of eyewitness identification is central to a criminal justice system 
dedicated the dual principles of accountability and fairness. 
Id. at 685.  This same principle applies equally here.  The list of factors that can affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications is long and is not always well understood by 
litigants, jurists or jurors.  By setting forth the factors that trial courts should consider in 
evaluating eyewitness identification evidence, this Court can encourage courts and 
factfinders to bring the law as it is practiced every day in courts throughout the state into 
alignment with current scientific research.  In addition, requiring courts to consider 
relevant system variables, such as blind administration, fair lineup construction, pre-
lineup instructions, and recorded, contemporaneous witness confidence statements will 
have the salutary effect of reducing the suggestiveness of out-of-court identification 
procedures, as well as in-court identification procedures that are based on out-of-court 
identifications.  
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently took a similar approach to this issue in a 
decision issued in June of this year.  In State v. Young, it rejected its state version of the 
Manson/Biggers test and adopted a new test to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications, aligning their standard with the findings in Lawson and Henderson.  
Young, 2016 WL 3369222 at *19.  The court concluded its extensive analysis of the 
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scientific research findings by holding that courts’ “analysis of reliability should consider 
all relevant system and estimator variables under the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 
*29. 
This Court should follow its sister courts in Alaska, Oregon, and New Jersey in 
comprehensively identifying the relevant system and estimator variables that trial courts 
and factfinders should consider when evaluating the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.  Identifying what scientific research currently considers the relevant 
variables while emphasizing the need to remain flexible to allow for the evolving nature 
of scientific research in the area will ensure that lower courts will evaluate the reliability 
of eyewitness identification through an approach that gives meaning to the term “totality 
of the circumstances,” and, most importantly, will reduce the risk of misidentification.  
In addition, where eyewitness identification testimony is ruled admissible, trial 
courts should use intermediate remedies, such as expert testimony and robust jury 
instructions, to blunt the prejudicial effects of any remaining unreliability and to provide 
jurors with context and information to appropriately analyze this evidence.  Although 
courts have historically relied on cross-examination and closing arguments to expose the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony, social science research has shown—
and this Court itself has recognized—that these methods are largely ineffective at 
bringing the unreliability of a mistaken but honest witness’s identification to light.  See, 
e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 21–22 (“[R]esearch shows the effectiveness of cross-
examination is badly hampered [where eyewitnesses express certainty about 
identifications that are inaccurate].”); accord Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 725–28; State v. 
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Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300 (Tenn. 2007) (citing scientific studies 
demonstrating that cross-examination is insufficient to educate the jury on the relevant 
factors). 
Likewise, as this Court has also recognized, robust, carefully written jury 
instructions that are grounded in science and tailored to the facts of the case should be 
used to caution jurors that the factors that affect reliability may be counterintuitive.  See 
Long, 721 P.2d at 492.  As with Ramirez, Utah was a leader in adopting an eyewitness-
specific jury instruction that referenced scientific research findings.  See Utah Model Jury 
Instruction CR404, available at https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/ 
inc_list.asp?action=showRule&id=32.  Recently, however, courts and commentators 
have concluded that instructions that comprehensively address all relevant factors that 
may have affected the reliability of the identification is necessary.  Such instructions will 
provide jurors—who are often unfamiliar with, or hold views counter to, the scientific 
research findings—sufficient guidance to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence.  
The eyewitness-specific jury instructions recently adopted by Massachusetts and New 
Jersey offer excellent examples of modern instructions that accomplish this goal.  See 
Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 900 (adopting provisional jury instructions that were “intended to 
provide the jury with the guidance they need to capably evaluate the accuracy of an 
eyewitness identification” because “the research makes clear that common sense is not 
enough to accurately discern the reliable eyewitness identification from the unreliable”)7; 
                                                 
7 (See also Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions on eyewitness identifications attached 
as Addendum B.) 
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New Jersey Supreme Court, Jury Instructions (July 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instruction.pdf.8 
II. CONSIDERATION OF THE ONGOING ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IS NOT AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE 
ISSUES 
In its response to the Innocence Project’s Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae 
Brief (the “Motion”), the State suggests that any argument that the Ramirez test is 
outdated and should be replaced “has never been made in this case and would enlarge the 
issues and the evidence before this Court.”  (State’s Resp. to Mot. for Leave to File 
Amicus Curiae Br. (“State’s Resp.”) at 3–4.)  Accordingly, the State argues that this 
Court is unable to reach the “expanded issue” raised by the Innocence Project, and the 
State reserves the right to move to strike the present brief.  (Id. at 4–5.)  With all due 
respect, the State’s position is preposterous. 
The Court should reject the State’s position for at least two reasons.  First, this 
Court may consider the Innocence Project’s position regarding the sufficiency of the 
Ramirez test because the parties themselves have raised the issue.  Second, this Court 
                                                 
8 Even if the Court were to refrain from modifying the Ramirez test in light of 
advancements in social science research, that research supports the lower court’s 
suppression of the challenged show-up and in-court identifications.  (See generally Br. of 
Resp’t on Cert. Review (“Br. of Resp’t”).)  The Court of Appeals correctly found that 
facts relating to each of the five Ramirez factors weighed in favor of inadmissibility.  See, 
e.g., Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶ 11–19. 
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may consider social science research because it is valuable reference material that does 
not expand the evidentiary record.9   
A. This Court Can Consider the Sufficiency of the Ramirez Test Because it 
Bears on Issues Presented by Both Parties to this Court 
Although an amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues on appeal, this brief 
makes arguments “that bear on the issues pursued by the parties to [an] appeal.”  Madsen, 
658 P.2d at 629 n.3.  As this Court has explained, “[r]eview on certiorari is limited to 
examining the court of appeals’ decision and is further circumscribed by the issues raised 
in the petitions.”  Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998).  The 
statement of question presented, however, “will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary 
question fairly included therein.”  Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4); see also Willardson v. Indus. 
Comm’n of Utah, 904 P.2d 671, 673–74 (Utah 1995) (considering subsidiary issue to be 
included in issue framed for review).  Furthermore, “this rule should be construed 
broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, however peripheral.”  State v. 
Leber, 2009 UT 59, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d 964 (quoting Sevy v. Sec. Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 637 
(Utah 1995)).  Contrary to the State’s suggestion that the issue “has never been made in 
this case,” its own petition for certiorari repeatedly referenced the Court of Appeals’ 
                                                 
9 The State mischaracterizes the relevant case law in arguing that the introduction of an 
alternative test to Ramirez would enlarge the issues before this Court.  Even accepting 
those cases it cites at face value, however, both are easily distinguishable from the 
present case.  In United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell and Madsen v. Borthick, the 
parties had not pursued the issue that the amicus brief discussed.  United Parcel Serv., 
Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 n.3 
(Utah 1983).  In the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals, the State’s brief, and the 
defendant’s brief all discuss whether Ramirez should be reexamined.  Lujan, 2015 UT 
App 199, ¶ 10 n.1; Br. of Pet’r at 19; Br. of Resp’t at 25–31.  
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invitation to this Court to revisit the Ramirez test.  (See, e.g., Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 
10.) 
Throughout its petition, the State criticized the Court of Appeals for its treatment 
of Ramirez and its recommendations to this Court.  The State claimed the majority 
merely “paid lip service to Ramirez,” while “it in effect imposed a standard exceeding 
that required in Ramirez.”  (Id.)  The State also took issue with the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that the Ramirez standard “does not accurately reflect the changed views 
about handling this problematic evidence.”  (Id. (quoting Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 
n.1); see also id. at 17 (same).)  Accordingly, the State specifically asked this Court to 
grant certiorari “to clarify that state due process does not require the exclusion of 
eyewitness identification unless it determines that it results from an unnecessarily 
suggestive police identification procedure.”  (Id. at 17.) 
In its opening brief before this Court, the State reiterated many of the same issues 
it raised in its petition.  Specifically, the State noted that “[b]oth the majority and the 
dissent urged review of the Ramirez standard for the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony, citing its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case.”  (Br. of Pet’r at 
19.)  And once again, the State implored this Court to “clarify the state due process 
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals.”  (Id.; see id. at 16–17 
(asking the Court to “clarify its state due process model governing the admissibility of 
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eyewitness identifications”); 29 (asking the Court to “clarify Ramirez to prevent further 
confusion about and misapplication of the state due process analysis”).)10  
Similarly, in his merits brief, the defendant raises concerns about Ramirez and 
responds directly to the State’s complaints.  (See, e.g., Br. of Resp’t at 25–31.)  Because 
both parties have made arguments concerning the Court of Appeals’ recommendation 
that this Court revisit the Ramirez test, the Innocence Project’s brief does not extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal.   
Accordingly, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that this Court consider 
the present brief in its entirety and reject any attempt by the State to strike any portion of 
it.  To the extent the Court agrees with the State that portions of this brief extend or 
enlarge the issues on appeal, the Innocence Project respectfully requests that the court 
deny the motion to strike in part and consider the portions of the brief that “bear on the 
issues pursued by the parties to this appeal.”  Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 n.3.  
B. This Court Can Consider Social Science Research in Deciding to Affirm 
the Court of Appeals’ Decision 
Even if the Court disagrees with the Innocence Project and finds that the issue of 
the sufficiency of the Ramirez test was not raised before by the parties,11 the Court may 
still consider the social science literature cited in this brief.   
                                                 
10 In addition, the State cites various studies regarding eyewitness testimony and appends 
them to its opening brief.  (See id. at 39–40, 43–44, 45, 47, Addendum D.) 
11 Counsel for Mr. Lujan, in its brief before the Court of Appeals, noted this Court’s 
review of the relevant scientific literature, which it described as “replete with empirical 
studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification.”  (Br. of Appellant at 
7–8 (citing Ramirez and Long).)  Similarly, the State cited various studies regarding 
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The State has suggested that consideration of such literature would result in an 
enlargement of the evidence.  As discussed above, however, this Court has long 
considered social science research to be a valuable resource, particularly in the context of 
eyewitness identification evidence.  See, e.g., Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶¶ 8, 15–38 
(discussing at length the social science research surrounding “eyewitness fallibility and 
the resulting possibility of mistaken identifications”); Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (Utah 1986) 
(considering the Court to be “compelled by the overwhelming weight of the empirical 
research to take steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness 
identification testimony”).  Other state supreme courts agree.  See, e.g., Lawson, 291 P.3d 
at 685–86 (noting that “it is imperative that law enforcement, the bench, and the bar be 
informed of the existence of current scientific research and literature regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identification”); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 720 (holding that experts 
may testify about the reliability of eyewitness identifications due to the “near perfect 
scientific consensus” and “broad based judicial recognition” that “eyewitness 
identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average 
juror,” as evidenced by scientific research on the topic); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877 
(adopting findings of court-appointed special master and finding that scientific evidence 
presented “convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the trustworthiness of 
eyewitness identifications should be revised,” and noting that “[s]tudy after study 
revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications”). 
                                                                                                                                                             
eyewitness testimony and appends them to its opening brief.  (See Br. of Pet’r at 39–40, 
43–44, 45, 47, Addendum D.) 
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The social science research cited by the Innocence Project is analogous to 
“legislative facts,” which are those that “inform policy-making decisions, as opposed to 
adjudicative facts which are facts distinctive to a particular case.”  Cruz v. Middlekauff 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1259 n.1 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Judging 38–39 (1990); Utah R. Evid. 201 advisory 
committee’s note).  Justice Zimmerman, in explaining “[t]he propriety of considering 
legislative facts in making policy decisions” cited a decision by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York, which held that: 
A court’s power to resort to less well known and accepted sources of data 
to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general evidential 
hypothesis purposes must be accepted because it is essential to the judicial 
process. 
Id. (quoting Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981)); accord State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 129 n.114 (Conn. 2015) (“To turn a blind 
eye to relevant and well established scientific or sociological knowledge that the parties 
may have overlooked or decided to leave unearthed, whether for strategic or financial 
reasons, would unjustly and unwisely subject the public at large to the results of an ill-
informed decision.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 323 (D.C. 1995) 
(“[C]ourts traditionally answer questions of legislative fact, and thus questions of law, not 
only by referring to evidence of record but also by considering non-record sources such 
as scientific and social science studies found in law reviews and other journals.”). 
A recent case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
instructive on the issue of the applicability of social science research.  In Young v. 
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Conway, Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project presented the court with a “robust and 
growing body of high-quality scientific studies addressing problems surrounding 
eyewitness identifications.”  Young v. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2013).  The 
Second Circuit ultimately decided to reference the studies in its opinion, “conclud[ing] 
that it was a good idea to make trial judges aware of the existence of this information, in 
effect, as additional tools to help them with their work.”  Id.  In so doing, the court made 
clear that it merely “aims to point the bench and bar to the existence of the studies and to 
go no further.”  Id.  In fact, the opinion itself is explicit that the court’s conclusion was 
not “compelled or controlled” by the literature it cited; rather, they merely reinforced the 
conclusion the court reached.  Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 79 n.8 (2d Cir. 2012).   
This Court should continue to consider social science literature as an important 
tool in ensuring that it takes all appropriate steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in 
the use of eyewitness identification testimony.   
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD WHEN 
IT REQUIRED THE STATE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANY ERROR IN 
ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS HARMLESS 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Under Utah law, the introduction of an unreliable eyewitness identification is a 
constitutional violation.  See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779–81.  Because the introduction of 
the tainted identification testimony in this case violated Defendant-Respondent’s 
constitutional right to due process, the Court of Appeals held that the State had the 
burden of showing that the eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 16.  This conclusion was a straightforward 
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application of this Court’s precedent.  Where the error in question amounts to a violation 
of a defendant’s constitutional rights, its “harmlessness is to be judged by a higher 
standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419,425 (Utah 1995). 
This Court’s approach to harmless error analysis is based on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  That decision, in turn, is 
based on the simple principle that the courts are responsible for protecting constitutional 
rights.  In establishing the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the Chapman 
Court recognized that courts possessed the “responsibility to protect” federal 
constitutional rights so that “[p]etitioners are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of 
unconstitutional inferences.”  Id. at 21, 26.  The Court recognized that “there are some 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error” and that an infringement of those rights would render the trial 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 23.  The same considerations apply here.  Defendant-Respondent 
is entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences from eyewitness 
testimony fraught with issues of unreliability.  
Social science research on the extent to which jurors rely on eyewitness testimony 
underscores how critical the harmless error standard is.  Because jurors tend to 
“overbelieve” eyewitness testimony to an extent that is not warranted by the facts, the 
admission of eyewitness testimony that is unreliable can be extraordinarily harmful.  See, 
e.g., Jennifer N. Sigler & James V. Couch, Eyewitness Testimony and the Jury Verdict, 4 
N. Am. J. Psychol. 143, 146 (2002) (finding that the conviction rate by mock juries 
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increased from 49% to 68% when a single, vague eyewitness account was added to 
circumstantial evidence).  In addition, a study of the first 250 DNA exonerations 
concluded that over 75 percent of those wrongful convictions involved mistaken 
eyewitness identification.  Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent:  Where Criminal 
Prosecutions Go Wrong 8–9 (2011).  The fact that 75 percent of wrongful convictions 
involve mistaken eyewitness identifications counsels in favor of courts adhering to their 
“responsibility to protect” defendants and their right to a trial free of tainted eyewitness 
identification testimony.   
The fact that the error identified by the Court of Appeals may have been solely a 
violation of the Utah Constitution does not change this analysis.  Just as federal courts 
have the responsibility to safeguard defendants’ federal constitutional rights, so too do 
the courts of this state have the parallel responsibility to safeguard defendants’ rights 
under the state constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 421 (Utah 1991) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).  A violation of a defendant’s state constitutional rights is 
no less serious than a violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitution.  Even if federal 
constitutional rights are not implicated, the State has the burden of proving that an error 
resulting in a Utah state constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
This Court has held that Utah’s inquiry into due process is “as stringent as, if not more 
stringent than, the federal analysis.”  Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.  There is no reason to 
relax that level of concern for defendants’ constitutional rights in the context of adopting 
an appropriate standard of review.  Insisting that the State demonstrate that the 
introduction of tainted eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a 
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reasonable doubt ensures that this Court can uphold its responsibility to protect 
defendants.  See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1240 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (“The framers of the Utah Constitution necessarily intended that this Court 
should be . . . the primary protector of individual liberties.”) 
This approach is consistent with the law of other states.  A number have adopted 
the Chapman standard for violations under their respective state constitutions.  See Van 
Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3, 11 (Del. 1987) (“[R]eversal is required whenever the 
reviewing court cannot say that the error was beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. 
Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (Idaho 2010) (“Idaho shall from this point forward employ the 
Chapman harmless error test for all objected-to error.”); State v. Bunch, 689 S.E.2d 866, 
868 (N.C. 2010) (applying Chapman for jury-instruction error violating state 
constitution).  Similarly, a number of states require the prosecution to bear the burden of 
proving that the error was harmless, although the standard is lower than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The Supreme Court of Montana, for example, has held that “the state 
will carry the burden of persuading the Court . . . that the violation was harmless.”  State 
v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934, 945 (Mont. 2010) (emphasis removed).  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska held that the prosecution must assume the burden of proving that the 
error was harmless.  Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1991) (noting that the 
defendant is the “non-offending party” and that placing the burden on him would be 
“manifestly unjust”).   
Moreover, Connecticut and the District of Columbia have extended the Chapman 
standard to violations of state law.  See State v. Artis, 101 A.3d 915, 928 (Conn. 2014) 
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(holding that state had burden of proving that admission of identification testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1004 (D.C. 
2005) (applying Chapman to statement admitted in violation of court’s precedent). 
This Court should make clear that the State has the burden of proving that errors 
infringing upon state constitutional rights are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project respectfully 
requests that, in light of current social science research, this Court revise the framework it 
set out in Ramirez, issue guidance on the importance of the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach, and instruct the lower courts on intermediate remedies, in 
accordance with the principles articulated above. 
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